The vaccine for smallpox as we know it doesn't require the virus itself. Biopreparat had an extensive genetic engineering program and may or may not have successfully weaponized an ebola/smallpox chimera (there's a disturbing amount of bragging surrounding the Soviet biowar program these days). FWIW, I have it on good authority that Rihab Taha was basically one good lab assistant away from creating airborne rabies. If you need to experiment and derive vaccines against an organism, your best results will come from the actual organism, rather than a convenient model of that organism.
Very true. I still wonder how beneficial an unmodified strain would be in creating a vaccine for a weaponized one, but I also know too little to form a decent conjecture. I never realized how reasonable modern concerns about biological warfare were until reading about Rihab Taha and Biopreparat just now. It always seemed like a bogeyman to me when I was growing up. Honestly, I'm just now waking up to a lot of the lingering effects of the cold war since I was only born around the time that the wall fell. Thanks for guiding me to some juicy (and morbidly terrifying) links.If you need to experiment and derive vaccines against an organism, your best results will come from the actual organism, rather than a convenient model of that organism.
We literally had no idea how hard-core the Soviets were about germ warfare until it was all over. The fucked up part I still don't understand is that a secret weapon has zero deterrent characteristics - if you don't know that they've got a gajillion gallons of weaponized anthrax, how can it keep you from gettin' aggro? It seems as if the Soviets brewed a bunch of bugs "just in case" and got nightmarishly good at it without anybody really knowing.
I've seen that movie! More seriously, does deterrence even work with biological weapons? They'll kill a lot of people, but they're probably not apocalyptic. Which, come to think of it, might be what they were really going for; bad, but not worth going nuclear in response to.
I can honestly say that I have given an undue amount of thought to the geopolitics of a secret biowar stockpile and have yet to come up with a satisfactory justification. Which doesn't mean there isn't one - it may say RAND corporation on my chair but I found it in an alley, after all. My working theory of the moment is that biopreparat was allowed to thrive because it was cheap, it represented diversification, and if the Soviets could hide it so easily surely the Americans must be, too. After all, before the Soviets could do any genetic research at all they had to shake off Lysenkoism and to make any progress they had to buy French and German lab equipment. It wouldn't surprise me if it ended up being easier letting things run their course than busting it up and dealing with it. Apparently the Iraqis were literally dumping vats of anthrax to hide evidence; supposedly Gorbachev knew about biopreparat but Shevardnadze didn't. Perimeter is easier to explain. The Soviets were never anywhere near as accomplished at nuclear war as the Americans were. We could get off a retaliatory strike in 30 minutes. The Soviets, by best estimates, were between 12 and 36 hours. They never had any first-strike doctrine because they had no illusions as to their survivability but they thought we were crazy enough to try it. Perimeter was a shortcut for a country that couldn't afford the Strategic Air Command.
By this thought process, could it maybe be that the Soviets were waiting for the Americans to reveal they knew something first? I imagine the secrecy would make the threat of their use seem more likely, and thus a stronger deterrent once eventually uncovered by their enemies. It added to the "crazy enough to do it" factor even into today. On top of that, a huge smoking gun like that could even serve as bait for enemy spies to potentially reveal themselves. I really do find it hard to believe that no other country caught a whiff of any of this, save for the 1979 anthrax outbreak.if the Soviets could hide it so easily surely the Americans must be, too.
The Cold War is one long, epic tale of second-guessing. The fundamental basis of US foreign policy for 40 years was a 5500 word telegram saying, in effect, "the Soviets will never see reason, box 'em in so the infection doesn't spread."
Such a perfect clip! I just realized that I probably missed everything last time I watched that movie and it's time for a rewatch.