That's the best I can do without asking you to read the paper. Some highlights:

In 1970, under the influence of the Soviet Union, Barre transformed his military dictatorship into a socialist one. Full-scale central planning pursued under the government’s policy of “scientific socialism” brutalized the Somali people. The government slaughtered civilians who posed threats to the government’s plans or political power, used coercive intimidation to create artificial support for its activities, and forcibly relocated others to further the political or economic ends of Barre and his cronies. “Both the urban population and nomads living in the countryside [were] subjected to summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom of movement and expression and a pattern of psychological intimidation” (Africa Watch Committee, 1990, p. 9).

The state ruthlessly suppressed free speech and controlled all forms of information reaching Somalis. Newspapers (only one was officially permitted by the government), radio, and television were fully censored and dissent in any form squelched with force. Under Somalia’s National Security Law No. 54, “gossip” became a capital offense. Twenty other basic civil freedoms involving speech, association and organization also carried the death penalty.

In 1975 all land was nationalized along with nearly all major industries and the financial sector. This facilitated government’s ability to expropriate citizens’ property for state projects, like massive state-operated farms, and for politicos’ personal use. Unpopular minority groups, such as the Gosha, were particularly easy prey. In the 1970s and 1980s Barre expropriated Gosha-occupied land to create state-owned irrigation schemes that benefited his allies. In other cases his minions expropriated land for their private use, making Gosha serfs on their own property (Menkhaus and Craven, 1996).

State control of industry in Somalia created inefficiencies like in the Soviet Union. Between 1984 and 1988, for instance, the government-owned Kismayo Meat Factory was open only three months per year. Government also owned tanneries. The “Hides and Skins Agency” paid herders less than half the market value of hides to process in these factories. These firms also utilized only a tiny fraction of their capacity. All told, capacity utilization of Somalia’s state manufacturing firms was less than 20 percent (Mubarak, 1997, p. 2028).

In the 1980s government turned to inflation to finance its corrupt and bankrupt projects. Between 1983 and 1990, average annual depreciation of the Somali shilling against the US$ was over 100 percent. In some years depreciation exceeded 300 percent (Little, 2003). Hyperinflation destroyed the savings of Somalis who managed to accrue modest sums over time.

In January of 1991 a coup d’état toppled Barre’s regime, creating statelessness in its wake.

By the late 1990s peace prevailed over most of Somalia. Until 2006, when the attempted reestablishment of central government sparked new violence, conflict was isolated and sporadic, confined when it did occur to pockets of small-scale rivalry in a few areas (Menkhaus 1998, 2004; Nenova, 2004). Important to this expanding peace was expanding commerce, discussed below (Menkhaus, 2004; Nenova, 2004).

The data depict a country with severe problems, but one which is clearly doing better under statelessness than it was under government....

Data for the pre-1991 period come from the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Report-Somalia 2001 and the World Bank/UNDP’s (2003) most recent Socio-Economic Survey in Somalia. Data for the post-stateless period are from the CIA World Factbook (2006), UNDP’s (2001, 2006) Human Development Report, the World Health Organization’s WHO (2004) Somalia Annual Report 2003, and the World Bank/UNDP (2003) Socio-Economic Survey in Somalia. Table 1 contains all 18 indicators and the results of the pre and post-statelessness comparison.

Importantly, the indicators in Table 1 also do not measure the substantial increase in personal freedoms and civil liberties enjoyed by Somalis since the emergence of anarchy. The Somali government ruthlessly suppressed free speech, censoring newspapers, radio and television. Most forms of free expression were punishable by death and foreign travel was severely restricted. Today, in contrast, Somalis are free to travel as they please (restricted only by governments of other nations) and enjoy greater freedom of expression, both privately and publicly. 20 private newspapers, 12 radio and television stations, and several Internet sites now provide information to the Somali public (Freedom House, Reporters Sans Frontieres, 2003). Satellite-based televisions enable the transmission of international news services, including CNN (Little, 2003, pp. 170–171). Authorities in Somaliland and Puntland have attempted to interfere with media providers in their territories, but freedom of expression remains improved compared to its status under government. This constitutes an additional important, though unmeasured, increase in Somali welfare under anarchy.

Also consider Wikipedia's article on the history of Somalia after the fall of Comrade Siad — though it is Wikipedia, so due attention to sources is advised.

The New York Times referred to post-state Mogadishu as "the ultimate example of deregulation," noting that "[g]utsy entrepreneurs, including some women, opened their own hospitals, schools… telephone companies, power plants and ports".

Somalia has some of the best telecommunications in Africa.... According to the CIA World Factbook, private telephone companies "offer service in most major cities" via wireless technology, charging "the lowest international rates on the continent."

private entrepreneurs have offered electricity generation on a localised basis, typically offering a choice of daytime, evening or 24 hour electricity. Gaalkacyo, a desert town in central Somalia, was provided with streetlights by local entrepreneur Abdirizak Osman, who expanded his enterprises from telecommunications to power generators, not only lighting the town but also supplying free electricity to the local hospital.

Since the fall of the government, dozens of private newspapers, radio and television stations mushroomed (Mogadishu has two fiercely competing TV stations), with private radio stations or newspapers in almost all major towns.

In 1991, before the collapse of the government, the national airline had only one airplane. Now there are approximately fifteen airlines, over sixty aircraft, six international destinations, and more domestic routes in Somalia. Private airlines, including Air Somalia and Daallo Airlines, serve several domestic locations as well as Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates, Paris and London. According to a 2005 World Bank report, the "private airline business in Somalia is now thriving with more than five carriers and price wars between the companies."

Following the destruction of educational systems and infrastructure during the civil war, many new educational institutions were opened by community members, private enterprises and Islamic NGOs.

Rival producers of Somali shillings emerged after 1991.... Private remittance companies known as hawala assist in the transfer of money. One of the largest such companies, Al Barakaat, was shut down in 2001 by a U.S.-led initiative due to alleged terrorist ties; the company's communications business, with more than 40,000 subscribers, was also shut down.